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The provisions of the sections of the Tariff Laws
for 1894 devoted to the tax upon incomes of individuals
and Corporations

are so intricate and confusing that

more than passing notice must be given to the details,
and mich careful study and scrutiny is necessary for a
proper understanding of the law.

To a layman the mass

of technical terms and legal phrases are almost bewildering as to their meaning and intent.

Who was exempted

from the payment of this tax, what property is exempted,
what are the formalities necessary to the making and filing of returns, and the scores of other similar questions
that may be raised are of personal importance to every
property-holder in this country.

But a far more import-

ant question is raised as to this law at the very outset.

This question is

"is

this Tax on Itncomes constitutional?"

A word first as to the reason for framing this law.
Beginning early in the year 1893 there caze urorn the busi
ness coLmnunity of this country a series of financial
troubles and embarrassments that affected the whole length
and breadth of the lan°d.

So far-reaching and widespread

was this trouble that the credit of our own national
government was impaired to such an extent that by the
wkthdrawing of money from our sub-treasuries to payfor
American bonds of all kinds that were being constantly
sent from Europe to this country for payment, the actual
money finances and assets of' the National Government were
reduced to a very low point, and actual national bankruptcy was threatened.

To meet this reduced condition

of the public treasury, and to retrench for future decrease of revenues owing to the reduced tariff rates, the
Congress of the United States passed, incltiding it in the
new lTariff Laws of 1894, a tax upon incomes.
This tax recognizes in its workings two cl asses of
taxable beings, the individual and the corporation.
what was this tax?

And

Upon the individual, it is a tax of

two percektum on the excess of four thousand dollars or,

the gains, profits and incomes of' every citizen and every
person,r~siding in the United States, derived from any
kind of property, rents, interests, dividends, salaries,
or from any trade, profession,

vocation,

or employment

carried on in the United States or elsewhere, granting a
few certain exceptions such as bonds of the United S~ates
whose principal and interest are by law exempt from taxation, and the salaries of state officers, and a few of
like nature.

As to corporations, the entire annual in-

come of all corporations is subjected to an annual tax
of two percett, exempting not only charitable, religious,
and educational institutions, as was allowed in prior
acts, but also are building and loan associations or companies, savings banks, and mutual insurance companies exempted, provided that these either loan to their share
holders only, or divide their profits with their depositors, or do their business on the mutual plan.

The ex-

emptions are granted without regard to the anrount of
property

or income of such concerns.

In addition-to

being obliged to pay upon the whole incom.e, the discrimination between individual and corporation is not confined
to this inequality.

Individuals whose incomes are under

thirty-five hundred dollars ($3500) make no returns, corporations must make returns if
of income.

there is

a single dollar

Individuals need pay a penalty only in case

of wilful neglect or refusal to make a return, the corporation by mere default is
thousand dollars ($1000).

subjected to a penalty of one
Corporations must disclose

the details and items of their business, individuals need
not.

Corporations must keep full and accurate accounts

which must be opened for the collector's inspection at
any time, an individual's books are free from inspection.
This section requiring the taxation of' corporations
is an entirely novel idea.

The previous Income Tax Laws

those of 1861 and the next succeeding years, and those of
1870, did not tax the incomes of corporatiorns except as
their dividends were included in the incomes of the individual stock holder.
It is claimed by the opponents of' this law that, being within Art. I section 2 and sec. 9 of the United
States Constitution, it is unconstitutional.

The tax is

a direct tax, they say, and as such is within the Constitutional prohibition.

There is no ambiguity about these

sections of the Constitution.

They say plainly, and

clearly, that

direct taxes shall be apportioned among the

states according to their representation and although the
framers of the Constitution may have overlooked this case
in hand, yet this is absolutely no reason, so they argue,
why the present law should be upheld.

Argument may be

made in favor of the law in that otherwise no tax on incomes can consitutionally be laid.

But even granting

this to be true the plain terms of' the Constitution can
not be controverted, for we must assume that when the
Constitution was accepted by the people, they did it
with f'ull knowledge and understanding of their act.

It

is as Chief Justice "1arshall has said in the case of
GIbbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheator. at p.188 "As -:.en whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words
which both direct'y and most aptly express the ideas they
intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our
Constitution ,nist be understood to have employed words in
their natur-,l sense and to have intended what they have
said."
But is a tax on income a direct tax within these
provisions of the Federal Constitution?

Do the words

"direct taxes" mean a tax on incomes as well as a tax on

land, or is it strictly confined to the tax on land?
It is known that in the year 1787, when this provi~ion of
the Constitution was adopted, many of the European nationS
including Austria, Bohemia, Belgium, France, Germany,
Switzerland, and Sweden were defining and treating as a
direct tax a tax on income.

The Privy Coumcil of Eng-

land has said "An income tax is always spoken of as a
direct tax and is generally looked upon as a direct tax
of the most obvious kind.

To deny it this character

would rim counter to the cormion understanding of men on
this subject, whIich is the one main clue to the meanihg
of the legislature.1"

When in 1797, Mr. Pitt, then Prime

Minister in England, found the indirect taxes inadequate
to furnish revenue, he laid direct -axes to mee# the deficiency, and among them he included an income tax of ten
per cent.

As a direct tax was this known, and subse-

quently through the uiany years following was it so known,
and mentioned by the political parties and by the public
press.
Mill in his"Principles of Political Economy", Book
V, Chap. 3 says "A direct tax is one demanded from the

very persons desired or intended to pay it.
es are either on incomne or expenditure.
income are rent,

profit,

or wages.

Direct tax-

The sources of

This includes every

kind of income except gift or plunder.

Taxes may be

laid on any one of' these three kinds of' income, or a uniform tax on all of' them."

Professor Ely in his "Taxa-

tion in Americarn States and Cities" says that an income
tax is a direct tax and so the Supreme Court of' Missouri
in 43 Mo. 479, has held.
The first judicial decision to deny this principle,
that a taX on income is a direct tax, is the Springer
case,

Springer vs. the United States 102 U.

S.

586.

this case the tax was held to be an excise or duty.

In
The

decision here was based upon the so-called "Carriage Case"'
Hylton vs. the U. S.,
Mi.

3 Dallas 171.

In this latter case

Hamilton, while defending the tax adva;ced t"e fol-

lowing theory "It is presumed," said he, "that a tax or
income is not a direct tax."

But although he gave abso-

lutely no authority and absolutely no evidence to support
his presumptiorn, the theory was adhered to by the Court7
and even in spi te of the fact that nine years had passed
since the Constitution had been adopted.

The justices

who suTported this opinion were by no means positive of
l.r.

the correctness of their views.

used the words "questionable point",
"I

Justice Patterson
Mr. Justice Chase

a-u inclined to think", kir- Justice Iredell "consider-

able doubt."
But it
ton's,

is upon this mere presum-ption of Mr. Hamil-

and these three doubtful expressions of the jus-

tices that the later cases have been decided, Veazie Bank
vs. Fenno 8

Wallace 546, Scholey vs. Rew,

Pacific Insurarnce Co. vs. Soule, 7 Wallace 433 and Springer vs. the United States, 102 U. S. 586.

And when the

opinion is unsupported or unwarranted by any evidence,
then the judicial decision can carry but little weight.
Certainly when all three justices were in doubt as to the
correctness of their position,

the question mst still

be open for review, and t,.e decision capable of being
modified by later direct evidence.

In later cases it is

only a valid opinion because 6f the doctrine of "stare
decisis".
As Mr.

Yet this must not be considered binding.

Lincoln once said in

regard to a certain judicial

decision "In this country nothing is ever finally decided
until it is decided in the right."

Let us remember too

that the statute in question in
statute passed in
need.

It

ti

the Springer case was a

;e of war a1id at a time of public

w s distinctly a war measure and was necessary

to strengthen the government

in

its

wezkened condition

and therefore it is not unreasonable to suppDose that loyalty to the Union may have influenced even the honored
justices.
But if

the conclusion in

ported by athority,

and if

the Hylton case was ursup-

now during a time of' peace

we can le,,ve out loyalty and public necessity from the
present consideration of the question,

then the older

decisions should have no weight upon the present question,
with new evidence, and should not prove a bar to a different conclusion if such conclusion is justifiable.
As has been already shown, at the time tj e United
States Constitution was adopted, direct taxes included in
most of the European countries a tax on income and we
have nothing in the published reports of the proceedings
previous to the adoption of the Constitution,
debates incident thereto,

or in

the

which lead us to suppose that

our early patriots intended to exclude the tax on- income
from the list of direct taxes.

At that time the terms

d irect tax" and "direct taxes,' were well known to every
person in this country.

The subject of taxation had

figured very prominertly among the causes which led to
the War of the Revolution, and it can safely be presumed
that every patriot in those stirring times knew fully the
idea intended to convey by those terms.

They were large,

ly used all through Europe, and to this day, as already
shown, the term includes a tax on income.
cult

to

helieve that

It is dit'fi-

the makers of the Constitution in-

tended to exclude such taxes.

Had such been their in-

tention we should have had some trace of it.

Did they

tl-en in prohibiting such taxation except in a certain
prescribed manner,intend to give it the full and logical
meaning given elsewhere in the world, or, did they intend
to limit and restrict the signification to taxes on land
and capitatin taxes only?

It

is necessary to find the

true intention of these nen and only then can we discover
the answer to this question.
in

their

original

The phrases must be taken

and derivative

introduced from Eirope into this

-eaning as they i;-ere
country, or else they

must be taken as applying to the "direct taxes" which the
states themselves were at that time imposing and collect-

ing, and the states in their practice were including a
tax on income a ong the direct taxes.
And in

the debates

incident to the submittir.

Constitution for ratification,

we find a general unanimi-

ty of opinion that taxes are to be laid
basis of' population only.

So 1&r.

so Mr. Payne, repeatedly urged.
70, 71, 72, 73.

So

of the

according to a

Chase, so Mrr. Adams,
1 Elliot's Debates pp.

it was held in the original Articles

of Confederation which provided that "all expenses incident to war or general welfare shall

*e defrayed out of a

comunon treasury, supplied by the several states in proportion to the value of the land, buildings arid improve-ients thereon."

One of Elliot's Debates 81.

Had this

beez. allowed to stand in such form it would of course
have been logical to assume that neither direct nor indirect taxes being mentioned, the only taxes allowed to
Congress to impose would have been upon the afore mentioned property, land, buildings a d improvements thereon,
But not so.
read

"

The Articles were amended so that they now

all expenses incident to war and the general wel-

fare shall
by the states

be defrayed out of a
in

coiwron treasury

supplied

proportiorL to the numrber of inhabitants.)

1 of Elliot's Debates 95.

this

As to the reason that
only quote Mir.

Storey,

change was -:ade,

we need

"Storey on the Constitution" sec.

253, "The principle which formed the basis of the apportionment was sufficiently
s+andard extremely
ferent states.

ohjectionable

unequal

in

The value of

just representative

its

took a

oper-.t ion upon the dif-

the l~nd was by no means a

of the pro,ortion

that

ought to make towards the discharge
dens.

as it

each state

of the coimmon bur-

The principle was objected to as unjust,

and inconvenient

in

its

oleration."

Mr.

unequal,

King of Massa-

chusetts gives substantially the same reason, 2 Elliots
Debates pp. 36, 56.
We have now this

testimony

buildings and improvements

that

t-he tax or. "lands,

thereon" was deliberately

jected as being unjust,

unequal,

at this

proposed to show that

later

(hirect taxes"

day it

is

and inconvenient,

re-

yet

the term

included the very things that were reject-

ed and only thosd things.
It

has been previously

asserted that

in

the European

countries a direct tax included a tax on income.

Not

only was this true of Europe, but it was true of this
country as well.

See "Ely on Taxation", pp. 109, 110,

"New letherlands
and polls.

Taxes on property

Colonial Txation,.

Direct taxes -Tere laid either in relation to

property held or according to irncolile."

incomes were taxed in Vermnt,

As early as 1779

so in Massachusetts as

early as 1706, in Connecticutt ir 1769, so in
in New Jersey,

Detaware,
And

in Virginia, in South Carolina.

how were these taxes known to the people while they were
Mr. Dawes of 'Massachusetts said in Conven-

paying them?

lassachusetts was to a direct

tion "The only course of
taxation."

2 Elliots Debates 41.

Virginia "At present very
taxes inthis country.

And Mr. Nicholas of

little is raised by

indirect

The public treasuries are supplieJ

by mreans of direct taxes."

2 Elliots Debates 99.

Mr.

Iredell of North Carolina said "Our state legislature has
no way of raising any considerable suxms but by laying
direct taxes."

4 Elliots Debates 146.

Morris on "The

Finances of' the United States" says "There is a concurrent jurisdiction respecting iiiternal or direct taxes."
And in Mr. Gallatin's Report to Congress in 1812 he speakS
of the taxes in convii.cing terms as direct taxes.
This establishes the fact that all the taxes which
the

:

eople in 1787 were paying were commonly known and

understood by them to be direct taxes, and that in addition to other sources of* collection of those taxes incomes were included and the tax on those incomes was used
for purposes of federal government,

arld the :ere fact

that in 1895 it is purposed to collect this by Federal
officers, while in 1789 it was collected by State officers, is not in itself sufficient ground for calling an
indirect tax that which in earlier times under precisely
similar provisions was called a direct tax.
To return to the Hylton case, which is the ground
work and main reliance for the contention that a tax on
income is not a direct tax.

In this case we find the

following dictum "The ),eneral division of' taxes is into
direct and indirect.

Although the latter term is not to

be found in the Constitution, yet the former necessarily
implies it.

Indirect stands opposed to direct.

Both

in theory and in practice a tax on land is deemed to be
a direct tax.

Whether direct taxes in the sense of the

Constitution comprehend any other tax than a capitation
tax and a tax on land is a questionable point."

The p er-

tinent question now is, where the Court discovered this
division of taxes into direct and indirect.

The liter-

ature of the day considered a tax on land and a tax on
income as alike direct taxes.
shown.

This has been already

It has also been shown that the customs of' the

people paying the taxes were to consider the tax on land
and the tax on income as direct taxes.
It
(1)

now safely follows:-

That an income tax,

as a direct tax existed long

before theCornstitution, as in New Netherlands, Vermont,
Massachtisetts, Connecticutt, Pennsylvania, Virginia, New
Jersey, Delaware and South Carolina; it exists also in
some of' the states after the Constitution, as in Massachu.
setts and in Connecticutt; and in one of the states,
Massachusetts, it has existed until the present day.

it

was as well recognized in those localities as any other
tax, and it was known a;.d called as a direct tax.
(2) When the words regarding direct taxes were introduced into the Constitution,

they were used,

as Chief

Justice Marshall said, "in their natural sense" and are
to be taken,as he also said, "in their natural and obvi-

ous ser se."

It is not an "obvious sense", nor a "natur-

al and obvious sense", to reject, from the taxes which
the people were p-iying as direct taxes when these words

jere used, a!l of such taxes except a tax on land, and
to limit and restrict the words, which were used to that
single tax.
The previous decision on this question should not be
afsufficient weight to altogether preclude any other
chances of a change of' decision, for, as Judge Story says
"Arguments drawn from impolicy or inconvenience ought to
be of no weight as the only sound principle should be to
declare - This is the law-, follow and obey-."

But even if' these taxes are not direct, and therefore the tax law could not be held void on that gound,
do they not still violate another Constitutional prowlsion in that they lack the uniformity which by that instrument is necessary to the validity of any tax laws passed
by Congress?

The Constitutional requirement is that

"all duties, taxes, and imposts shall be uniform throughout the United States", Art. I sec. 8.

Once, in a case

reported in 5 Wheaton at p. 317, the Criurt has in respect
to"excises" declared that they must be "alike" for every
purposes

in other respects we have uniformity, as to

states, as to ports, as to the thing taxed, as to the

person taxed, ,,s to the rate.

Then how can Congress be

permitted to violate, as it does, the rule of such uniformity?

How can Congress be peilitted to exempt either

all incomes under four thousand dollars ($4000), of private individuals, or the total incomes of certain favored
corporations?
In the case of Building and Loan Associations this
lack of uniformity is very apparent.

These associations

have been increasing in niumber and in capital during the
past few years until now the total amount of cash represented by their combined capitals will reach high up into
the billions.

One in Dayton, Ohio, alone has an actual

capital of over ten million dollars, andin the state of
Ohio alone the earnings of these associations for the
year 1893 a-'ounted to over $2,900,000.

A similar state

of affairs can be found in any of our states, and the individual association will in nearly every case be found
to be having an average profit of at least ten percent.
Yet there is nothing in the nature of any of these exempted corporations or associations that can be possibly
claimed to be of a specially public or benevolant character.

The case with Savings Banks is that of a commonly
accepted, though erroneous, belief that these are in the
nature of a

lublic cliarity and so must receive special

public aid and exerptions.

But in this respect the

Pennsylvania courts have said, in West's Appeal, 64 Pa.
St. 186,
is

193 "It has not the semblance of a charity.

specifically

poses -

a business corporation for

It

pecuniary pur-

to receive deposits of money, invest them for the

security of the depositors, and repay them with interest.
And so in the case of Coite vs. Society for Savings, 32
Conn. 173, "There is no reason why they should not contribute their full share to support the government through
which they exist and flourish."

This case was carried

to the United States Supreme Court and the desision was
affirmed,

6 Wallace 594.

As regards rxit-.al insurance companies.

Under the

prior lawsl as in 1864 (sections 120 and 122, Laws of 1864)
and in 1870 (sec.

15, Laws of 1870) these companies -;ere

specifically taxed and why should they be exdmpted now or
ever?

It

is true that they conduict their business on a

somewhat different plan from that of other insurance companies, but still this business is a strictly private one

in which t.e public has no interest and repeatedly we
find them held to be in no sense benevolent or charitable
So hold the cases reported at 21 How.

organizations.
35,
385,

21.N. Y. 52, 46. N. Y. 477, 30. Kan. 585, 75 Mich.
35 lMinn.

458, 69 Tex.

561,

aid many others.

See the irimense amounts of capital of these mutual
insurance corporations.

Out of a total of 1926 corpora-

tions engaged in the insurance business, we find that
1689 are doing business on the mutual plan.

The total

of the 237 companies working on a plan of stockasets
A
holding is $278, 000, 000, while the total assets of the
companies working on the mutual plan is $1,200,000,000.
The$278,000,O00

of capital is taxed, the$1,200,000,O00

is exempted simply from the fact that they are doing business on the mutual plan.

Thus a company carrying on

business on a plan of' stock holding must pay the tax,
while its next door neighbor, with the same business in
the same locality, with the same customersbut carrying
on business on the mutual plan need not pay.

For illus-

tration, the largest marine insurance company in the United States is a New York concern with $12,000,000 of assets.

Its principal competitor is a Pennsylvania corpo-

ration with $5,000,000 assets but on a stock plan.

The

New York company is exempted, the Pennsylvania company
pays two per cent upon every dollar of net profits or
income.
The sole condition for the exemption of these favored corporations arAd associations is declared to be that
they shall make loans to, or divide their profits among,
their members, or depositors, or policy-holders.
corporation,

no matter how created is

Every

for the benefit of

its own individual members whether they be called stock
holders or depositors.

Exemptionslike this were never

before made but, on the contrary, these associations were
expressly taxed.

But now if' the business of the com-

pany is carried on for its stock holders' benefit, every
dollar of its income is taxed, yet if carried on for its
policy-holders' or depositors' benefit every dollar of
income is exempted from taxation.

Imm=ense amounts of

money will be thus exempted from their fair

amount or

proportion of' paymient by the causes in this act.

Over

*1,000,000,000 in the state of New York alone is thus
exonerated and in
wealth.

the other states in

proportion to their

Jidge Cooley in his work on "Constitutional Limitations" says, "Every thing that may be done under the
name of taxation is not necessarily a tax, and it may
happen that an oppressive burden, imposed by the government, when carefully scrutinized will prove, instead of
a tax, to be an unlawiul confiscation of property and
,nwarranted by any principle of constitutional government.

In the second place it is of the very essence of

taxation that it be levied with equality and uniformity,
and to this end that there shruld be some system of apportionment.

Where the burden is common there should be

co,-qon contribution to discharge it.

Taxation is the

equivalent for the protection which the government afford s
to the person and property of its citizens, and as all
are alike protected, so alike should all bear the burden,
in proportion to the interest secured*

...

Whatever be the basis of the taxation, the requirement
that it be unifor:

is universal."

So Dillon in his

work on "Municipal Corporations","Taxation implies that
the imposition shall be by some system of apportionment
so as to secure uniformity among those who are, or ought
to be subject to the particular tax or assessment.

Hence we -uay readily conceive of acts of' the Legislature,
demanding scrifices of' citizens, that could not be sustained as tegitimate exercises of' the taxing power, although no specific provision of' the Constitution shall
be infringed."

So Desty, "Ddsty on Taxation",

"Equality

in the imposition of the burden is of the very essence of
the right, and though absolute justice and absolute equality may not be attainable, the adoption of some rule tending to that e--d is indispensable.

..........

Where proper-

ty is taken from the citizenby the sovereign will, and
appropriated, without his consent, to the public benefit
the exaction should not be considered a tax unless similar contributions are exacted from such constituent members of the same community generally as own the same kind
of property. .. b.

A tax though not perhaps universal

must still be general and uniform."
In view of' these statements and figures is this exemption of' a

certain

few favored corporations

the "unif'o-

mity" that is required, and promised to all of the people,

by the Constitution?

Mr. Hill, the senior senator

from N. Y. state, said, in his sp ech in the Senate on
January 11,

1895;

"

"The tax on incomes is

not unriform throughout the

United States for the following reasons,
(1) The act professes to exempt all incomes of $4000 and
under, yet if a citizen has an income of' $4000 or less,
and it is all invested in corporate shares, there is no
exempjtion at all for the corporation in which the earnings are held is required to deplete the net earnings to
which the share holder is entitled, by the amount of the
income tax.

Thus a person so situated is deprived of

the exemption accor~ied to others.
(2) If several persons each having a taxable irncome happen to live together as one family they are jointly entitled to but one exemption of $4000 , instead of an exemption of' $4000 on each insome.
(3)

The salaries due to state,

county,

and mnicipal

officers are exempt from the payment of the income tax.
(4) All corporations for charitable, religious, educational, or beneficial purposes, all building and loan
associations, who loan to their share holders only and a
large class of' insurance companies and savings institutions are exempt from the payment of the income tax.
(5) The income on certain United States bonds is exempted.

If

it

be urged that the United States car. not repudiate

its contract with the bond holders, that their bords
shall be free of tax, it is a sufficient answer to say
that the Constitution requires a uniform tax on income,
and if it exonerates one person. fro4 the payment of the
tax, it thereby exonerates all."
So speaks hr. Hill. and he seems correct in his
reasoning and logical in his argument.

But another

view is presented when we corlsider that there is absolutely no reason why the exemption of' any income whatever
should be allowed.

A uniform rate would require that

every person, no matter how small his income, should
pay his just and fair proportion.

It is the privilege

and duty of' every citizen of this country to contribute
his own share towards the maintenance of his own federal
government, and the man with $500 income should be no
more exempted than should the man with $5000 income.
Upon grounds of public policy ard prudence it might be
contended that the exemption of the smaller incomes is
because of the greater need, of the man with the small
income, for every penny that he earnis.

But this is a

question of the practicability of the income tax, not of

its

constitutionality,

is not fulfilled

and the requirement of' uniformity

when any exemption of' however small an

income is -llowed.
These are the principal coistitutiornal objections
to the validity of the sections of the Tariff Laws of
1894 devoted to a tax on income.

There are other ques-

tions such as the "class legislation" so made by the
exemptions ar.d limitations, and also the que~tion of the
power of the governmenit to tax an income derived from
state!bonds, or the bonds of counties or municipalities.
Buit these questions are of minor importance and need not
be considered here in this paper.

The main points in

question are as to the alleged violation of the
Constitutional requirement that direct taxes shall be
laid only by apportionment upon the several states,
and that taxes must be uniform throughout the whole land.
As to the first contention we have shown that at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution the colonies
were imposing and collect4ng a tax on income and that
such tax was considered a direct tax.

We have shown

that this was the common understanding throughout civilized Christendom, and is the com-ion understanding to

this day in all European countries.

We have shown that

in several of the states the tax on income was continued
for mrny years after the adoption of' the Constitution and
in one of the states is so continued, as a direct tax,
to this day-

We have shown that there was nothing said

or done in the Constitutional Conventions previous to
the adoption of the Constitution that would lead any one
to suppose that the Constitution-makers intended to exclude a tax on income from the list of direct taxes where
it had always been placed.

The cases holding otherwise,

notably the Springer case, were based on fallacious reasoning deduced from the early Hylton case in 3 Dallas, and
that even this case was decided on the bare assertion by
Mr. Hamilton that it was presumed that "a tax on income
would be an indirect tax."

This presumption was abso-

lutely without authority and unaccompanied by evidence
as to the intention of the framers of the Constitution.
Mr.

Hamilton gave this presumption nine years after the

debates in

the convention,

and it

is

neither unpatriotic

nor treasonable to believe that his memory was faulty,
especially when we recollect that the opposite view was
universally held at the time of' the adopton.

As to the other contention,
formity

that it

required by the Constitution,

given the pointsand the speech of
them in a concise manner.

vir.

lacks the uni-

we have already
Hill

"Uniformity"

reiterates

requires that

all

persons be taxed alike as the given cases show and otherwise such enactments must be totally invalid.
t 44 Ill. 229,

45 Ala.

145 Ill. 313, 8 Ia. 82, 31 Kan. 473,

62 Maine 62, 40 Md. 22, 145 Mass. 108, 95 Mich. 466, 60
N.H. 219, 62 Pal St. 41-)l,

57 Tex. 635.

There carn be no

valid reasons why those corporations are to be exempted.
They are not for public benefit, and can not claim any
privileges as such.

Any attempt to exclude them because

of' any such purported public character must therefore
fail, and vitiate the whole law.
The words "vitiate the whole

law" are used because

it is manifestly impossible to separate the law into its
parts and to leave standing one part and expunge another.
It was the plain intention of Congress to exempt certain
corporations, and to

include in the tax a tax on proper-

ty that would necessarily become a direct tax.

To cut

out one part and to allow another to stand would be in
effect a new law, arising it is true from the ruins bt*

the old, but still a n-ew law and the old would be entirely eliminated.
The authorities are numerous that hold to the proposition that if this law is to fail in any of its essential parts the whole s,ructure must fail.

The principle

cases are 114 U. S. 270, 120 U. S. 678, 127 U. S. 1,
Congress s-ecifically enacted this measure and -)articularly held certain corporations exe.pt, and if we now
say that this exemption was illegal the means are still
lacking to enforce collection and payment of taxes by
these corporations.

The case of Spraigue vs. Thompson,

118 U. S. 90, is an authority anA her we find this statement, "By re3ecting the exceptions intended by the legislature of Georgia, the statute is made to enact what confessedly the legislature never meant.

It confers upon

the statute a positive operation beyond the legislative
intent, and beyond what any one can say it would have
enacted in view of the illegality of the exceptions."
And even if the previous decisions are, as in the
Hylton and Springer cases, against the correctness of
this argument, let us still remember the words of Kent
in Book I at p. 477 "Even a series of decisions is not

al'ays conclusive,
resolves

itself

and the revision of' a decision often

into a mere queation of' expediency."

And it is to be hoped that il the present contention
in

the Supreme Court will result in

a decision against

the validity and constitutionality of this tax law.
is odious, it

it

is inquisitorial, it is un-American, it is

a blot upon the fair

name of this country,

and to the

Supr xae Court is left righting of this wrong perpetrated
upon the-citizens of' the United States by their represent,
atives in Congress.

And of that tribunal it has been

said:
"Having its

origin in the sovereignity of the people,

it is the bulwark of the peo-ple against their own unadvised action, their own 1unadvised will.

It saves them

not only from their enemies, it saves thegna from themselves.

April 6,

1895.

